Goa 1961 by Valmiki Faleiro

The Complete Story of Nationalism and Integration

I have a confession to make. I was filled with trepidation when I picked up this book. For those who, like me, were born in 1954, will understand why and how my childhood years were filled with pacifism and a deep love for peace, love and choosing negotiation over confrontation. Besides, here’s a topic I knew nothing about. But that’s the whole idea, isn’t it? To read and to learn.

First of all, the book lives up to the title and the sub-title and from Page1 you know that you’re in for a well-researched, rock-solid documentation written by a writer who knows his ammo. For anyone interested in Goan history, culture, social life, architecture, cuisine, stories from Goa and stories about Goa, I suggest you read the Political Timeline carefully. It is a summary of the history of Goa and helps us understand the backdrop against which all the action that happened prior to and in 1961.

In civil life, we often imagine things and say, “What if? What if such-and-such person had not come into my life or guided me in this direction?” Valmiki says this in an academic way. The book is filled with hidden gems, diamonds, minefields and shockers, things that we (at least I) did not know about.

Did you know? That Hyderabad wanted to buy Goa from the Portuguese? Made sense to him to have direct access to Pakistan by sea! And in case you were wondering how tiny pockets like Dadara and Nagar Haveli came into the hands of the Portuguese,here’s the story. “Daman included hinterland areas of Dadara and Nagar Haveli, which were at some distance inside Gujarat. The Peshwas had given a jagir (revenue grant) vide treaties of May 1779 and 11 January 1780 over 72 villages of Nagar Haveli to the Portuguese as compensation for the burning of the ship Sant'Ana by Janoji Dulap in 1773.” The deal was that the Portuguese would recover the cost of the ship through revenue from the lands but that never happened and the two places remained with the Portuguese.

The other interesting fact is that despite Salazar being a devout Catholic (often described as more papal than the Pope) he did not bow to papal criticism of his “iron hand” in Angola and Goa. When 200 churches and a Vatican deputation made a statement saying that, “the Roman Catholic Church identifies with the urge of the dependent people for self-determination” the dictator did not budge. 

Now this one is a shocker. We all know about the blockade against Goa and how essentials became painfully scarce. But we did not know that the whole idea of the blockade was initiated to “inspire the Goan population in Goa to rebel against the Portuguese”! That it backfired is another story. Of course, as Valmiki points out, “diplomacy can only succeed if both parties desire a solution”. 

Here’s another shocker. The author tells us that the Portuguese were aware of the iron and manganese ore in Goa but they were afraid to begin exploration lest “it drew the covetous eyes of the British in India”. I’m running out of exclamation marks here!

So, when Valmiki tells us that the Goans in Portugal distributed pamphlets urging “Salazar to negotiate with India and free Goa” strangely enough, there was no support from the Indian press. Why does this sound familiar? It is the case even today. Try creating awareness on heritage conservation, the Mhadei issue,double tracking lines that will overrun heritage neighbourhoods or the battle to save the tigers in Goa. See what I mean?

The book has some volatile sentences such as the one when the US State Department asked “why India (when she should have been the one with the most interest) was silent or was she just benefitting from Goa” or when Dr V S Gaitonde linked the Gujarati businessmen in Mozambique to India’s apathy of the situation in Goa.

No one I have read so far has ever mentioned the gate erected at Dhobi Talao in Bombay on 26th January 1961. It said, “Remember Goa is not yet free”. We wonder who was the author of that courageous reminder.

Another shocker. While Nehru continued to speak of non-violence and that India would not use force to free Goa, his Defence Minister, V K Krishna Menon was actively planning to take over Goa  by force. This happened in December 1961 as we all know but we did not know that the strategic plans for the use of force were put in place in the month of August that year.

After years of platitudes, why was the time right to take Goa by force? “China was too powerful to be accosted over Aksai Chin. To take on Pakistan in Kashmir meant an all-out war”. Goa was a cake walk. The chapter titled Majestic Menon tells it all. The 1962 China War when India suffered its most humiliating defeat in battle “As Defence Minister, Menon lorded over a realm of which he only had a rudimentary idea. But he did it with a flourish as one with an inherited fiefdom would.” Scams involving crates of whiskey and boxes of armaments, jeeps that were not battle worthy and promotions that were not due are all too familiar and yet makes your blood come to a boil. This chapter on the second most powerful man in India, after Nehru, must be read to be believed.

We learn that V K Menon probably suffered from a mental illness and was on long-term medication. There is no shame in that. However, it does beg the question whether he was qualified to take the decisions he did. “But whether this had any influence on India’s decision to use force in Goa is a matter of conjecture” says the author in all fairness. Ironically, the African states still under Portuguese rule at this time were looking at India to play a pivotal role in their liberation!

In the drama that led up to the use of force in Goa Valmiki tells us that small skirmishes were deliberately planted months in advance to provoke the Portuguese and these then used as provocations to attack.The Indian army that marched into Goa was far superior, far outnumbered the Portuguese soldiers stationed here. So why did India “use a sledgehammer to swat a fly?” Faulty intelligence. The smugglers aided the deliberate planting of a military build-up where there was none. Simply put, they had to justify the use of force.

As if those lies weren't enough, stories of heroism were being fed to the Portuguese citizens in Portugal, a battle described where even if there was a will to fight back, there were no means. In the chapter titled Operation Vijay (The Actual Military Ops) the description is filled with drama, intrigue, comedy of errors (my favourite is the story of how the barking dogs gave away the Indian intruders) but for me, the most interesting thing is the choice of various code names for the missions.

“Raat Din, Prem Pujari, French Toast, Baby Girl, Madhubala” these were some of the code names. What does this indicate? A love for Hindi cinema or a stereotypical view of Goa and Goans? In the chapter titled The Aftermath there is an interesting and compassionate understanding of how the world saw the use of force to liberate Goa from Portuguese rule. 

For some of us, Goa is the land of our adoption, a land filled with fallacies and foments, wisdom and learnings, of untold stories and unlimited possibilities. In the last chapter Valmiki tells us that whoever tries to decipher or decode Goa is rather like a blind man with an elephant in the room. Only, sometimes, it is the elephant that tries to decode you.